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ABSTRACT 
This paper adapts a partial equilibrium approach of Allais and Diewert to measure the efficiency 
loss in the producing sector due to quotas. The measure of waste is the additional profits available by re-
allocation subject to constraints that the welfare of persons and firms outside the sector is unaffected It 
is relevant to a sector which faces fixed prices for some commodities, but endogenous prices for others. 
Tobacco quotas in the United States are estimated to have caused quota-induced producer-sector waste of 
approximately $95 million per year during 1950-82, or about 3 percent of the average value of the crop. 
Key words: waste, deadweight loss, production sector, quotas. 
AN ALLAIS MEASURE OF 
PRODUCTION SECTOR \VASTE DUE TO Ql.;OTAS 
Agricultural production quotas arc a policy instrument that many countries hen e adopted a~ a 
means of transferring income fmm consumers to producers. Evaluation of the social waste. or 
dcalh\cight loss. due to these policies will be an important task as countries adjust tone\\ international 
tradl!lg rules.~ In addition. the environmental movement has led to potcntialne\\ uses t>f quotas to bring 
resource use and resource contamination closer to socially optimal level:.;. and this will place further 
hmdcns on the adequacy of economic analysis ofthe welfare effects of quotas. Despite the importance 
,1fthesc issues. the welfare analysis of quotas has received little attention. even thuugh the case of quota~ 
dtffcrs from that of price interventions because the analysis must be C.\.plicit in quantity space with 
corresponding evaluations in terms of virtual prices. 2 FUiihcrmore. the current practice in agricultural 
and resource economics is to measure deadweight loss using :V1arshallian or Hichian social <>urplus 
trtangks. but these concepts imply interpersonal wclbrc assumptions that many analysts \hlltid Jlllt \\is it 
to make. The contribution of the present study i~ tl• extend Dicvvcrt's ( 1981. 1987) cnncept of procluctJtHJ 
sector \\aste to the case of quotas to provide an empirically useful deadweight loss measure. 
It is important to clarify the limitations of uther approaches to measuring \\elfare loss due tt1 
quotas. 1 We stm1 with the observation that the willingness of a consumer or producer to pay to e.\.chang.c 
the current set of external circumstances (prices. for e.\.ample) for some hypothetical alternative set u! 
circumstances is fundamental to \Vclfare measurement. It is the intuitive notion that underlies 
cnnsumers' and producers' surplus as introduced by Dupuit and Marshall and later refined by Hicks 
( 194:::: ). If \\C evaluate each agent's willingness to pay to exchange the set of effective prices under a 
quota regime for the hypothetical set of prices that would exist without quotas. then aggregation across 
mdl\ iduals would provide a money metric measure of the net welfare efkcts of the quotas. If those who 
gain from the change would be willing to pay more for the change than losers would require as 
compensation fc1r accepting the change. then the e.\.cess amount is a measure of deadweight loss due to 
the quotas. 
The issue of compensation presents a paradox in this approach tu vvelfan: analysis. I r the 
analy·sis assumes that winners du not actually compensate losers, net aggregate willingness to pay has 
little if any significance as a welfare measure unless we accept the assumption that the utility value of a 
dollar lost h:· each (or the welfare function evaluation of that utility value) is exactly equal t,1 the utilitv 
value of a dollar gained by each winner. The l-Iicks-Kaldor criterion asserts that even in the absence \lf 
compensation this measure is a valid guide to social choice, but we assert that the assumption is so :;trong 
that it is useful to explore alternative conceptual measures. 
Paradoxically, if winners H'('rc to compensate losers, then the reference equilibrium usually 
examined is not the appropriate cquilibrium. 1 The analysis must be altered so as to identify a reference 
equilibrium that is appropriate to the modified income distribution-- this requires a general equilibrium 
approach. Fvaluations of deadweight loss 111 a general equilibrium framcvvork go back to Pareto.' but 
m,•c;t arc based on aggregate net willingness to pay without compensation (such as 13oiteux's aggregation 
elf individual consumers' l-licksian variations in a general equilibrium framework. including the 
contributions by llotelling, by Harberger, and many others). 
!\llais ( 1943, 1977). however. developed a fully compensated general equilibrium measure uf 
deadweight loss. lie proposed to measure \vastc as the quantity of a good or basket of goud~ (perhap:-
moncy) that could be extracted from an economy by reallocating subject to the condition that the 
satisfaction level of every consuming unit remains unchanged(' Debreu's ( 1951) coefficient of resour--:e 
utilization is a related measure ohvaste. as is Diewert's ( 1981. 1987) measure of producer sector waste. 
;\tan i\llais reference equilibrium, compensating transfer payments need not be considered, becau~c the 
allocation is one that maintains each consuming unit at its original level of satisfaction. 
But the J\llais approach is still quite demanding in the information required about consumn< 
uti lit\ functions This is because the analyst must knmv enough about each consumer indifference 
~urface to be able to identi(v all alternative consumption bundles that would keep the consumer on that 
surface. The ambitiousness of this information requirement led Dievvcrt ( 1981, 1987) to propose a 
partial equilibrium approach where only reallocations within the producing sector are considered, \\hilc 
using relevant supply and demand conditions to insure that consumers stay at their initial utility levels. 
This approach requires information only on technology and distortions within the producing sector. and 
it pn1vicks the basis for the approach that we develop in the following analysis. 
A Measure of Production Sector Loss Due to Quotas 
We begin with Allais' concept of distributable surplus (italics added): 
In a given situation, the maximum distributable surplus of any good 
whatever, for a given group of operators (consumption or production 
units) disposing of given resources, may be defined as the maximum 
quantity of this good which can be made available subject to the triple 
condition 
(i) that all the indexes of preference of the consumption units in the gwup 
maintain values \Vhich are at least equal to those they had in the ::,ituation 
considered: 
(ii) that the resources used remain at levels which arc at most as h1gh as in the 
initial situation: and 
(iii) that the production this group makes available to the rest of the economy 1s 
at least equal to \vhat it supplied in the initial situation. ( 1977, p 11.\ ). 
It is c !early within the bounds of this definition to consider money as the reference good (A !Ia is 
himself later does so), and to consider, as does Diewert, any arbitrary set of production units as the group 
for \vhich surplus is examined (sector hereafter). Condition (i) becomes irrelevant because there arc !1() 
consumers in such a group. but conditions (ii) and (iii) remain to insure that consumers and others 
outside the producer group arc not made worse ofT by any reference equilibrium considered. Our 
Jmplcmentation of the Allais concept is to measure the maximum amount of additional money (pmllh) 
that can be extracted from the production sector7 by a hypothetical reallocation subject to the i<J~t t\w 
conditions. If the measure i~ positive, there are more than enough protlts at that reference equilibrium tu 
replace the quotas \vith lump-sum transfers that leave each firm with the same level of profits as under 
the quotas. 
ro develop an explicit model of this concept, it is useful to distinguish between fixed-price 
commodities and tlex-pricc commodities. The sector is defined to be a price-taker in the markets t\1r 
fi:.:ed-pricc commodities. For flex-price goods, however. changes in net exports from the sector ur 
realllKations within the sector will affect equilibrium prices. We measure all commodities except !!xed 
inputs as nctputs. negative values indicating quantities used and positive values quantities provided. 
Lsing superscripts to index firms and subscripts to index commodities, \Ve define: 
x ·~ r·c: . . x;: ;'as firmj\ netput ofN fixed-price commodities \vith price p = (p 1, ··.fl\ )' 
y' ~ i\J ._\ 1'1 )'as firmj's netput of ,\1 tlex-pricc commodities with price r = (r 1, .. ..r 11 )'. 
q' ~I if . . (/;'as firmfs netput quota for I quota commodities vvith price w = lw 1, ... , H 1 ;'. 
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z1 = (z; .. ,::;)'as firm/'s quantities of fixed inputs, and 
X. Y and Q as summations across the F firms of the corresponding vectors. 
Since variables arc defined as netputs, the sums X, Y, and Q represent net exports of 
commodities from the sector. Now consider the initial quota-distoried equilibrium in which <~ggregate 
sector profit is p' X'+ r0 ' Y) + w0 'Q11 , where superscripts (I represent initial values of those prices and 
quantities that 111 ight be affected by any reallocation within the sector. Our measure of production ~ector 
~·ITicierlC) luss is the maximum amount by \vhich this profit could be increased by a hypothetical 
reallocation within the sector. subject to the constraints that Y=Y1• and Q=Q0 These two constralllts 
111surc that all prices outside the sector arc unchanged by the reallocation: in turn. this insures that the 
\\elfarc of persons outside the production sector remains unchanged. true to tht spirit of i\llais' more 
general measure of waste. 
fo derive an algebraic expression cfthis measure ofwastc, first define a restricted profit 
function for each l~nn as 
(1) 
i\ corresponding sector-level restricted profit function can be defined as 
(2) 
= p · K(p~v.q,z), 
whcrcy. q and z, respectively. are (F.\.[)xl. (F})xl and (F])xl vectors representing the distribution across 
all firms of flex-price goods. quota goods and fixed inputs. 
We can now def~ne the measure of production sector waste as the maximum extra prof~t to he 
generated within the sector by reallocation of both flex-price commodities (y) and quota commoditie~ (q) 
across firms: i.e .. 
5 
y, q 
(3) Y = yo' 
licnotl: the solution to (3) asy*, q* (with associated x* and aggregate values Y*, Q* and X*) and denote 
\he sc 1 lut ion values m f the Lagrangian multip I iers as r* and w*, reflecting Internal shadmv prices for flex-
pncc and quota commodities, respectively. These values represent the hypothetical reference 
cqttilihrium against vvhich the quota-distorted equilibrium is compared. The measure of waste can he 
ex pressed as 
L(p J! 0,q 0, z) = II(p;y ",q ·,z) - Il(pJ! 0,q 0,Z), or 
=p(X"-X 0), or 
(4) 
In other words. since the optimal reallocation vvithin the sector is subject to the constraint of nu change 111 
the net sectoral exports Y and Q, the measure of waste is unaffected by whether or not Y and Q arc 
included in the measure of profit, nor by whether they are priced at initial external prices or at the 
internal shadow prices for the hypothetical reallocation. 
The reference equilibrium expressed in equations (3) and (4) is of course not directly 
observable. hut it could be computed from full information about the technologies or profit functions and 
the initial equilibrium, using a suitable method of solving the simultaneous equations system. Scconcl-
cmlcr approximations of the profit functions vvould similarly permit approximation of the reference 
equilibrium Die\'vert offers another set of approximations useful vvhen information about tlex-price 
commodities is not available. First reallocate quota only, subject to firms' independent optimi7ation 
under the hypothetical assumption that flex-price commodity prices remain at initial levels: 
6 
(5) Q 
Second, repeat this exercise under the assumption that flex-price commodity prices arc fixed at 
r* (the optimal shadow prices from equation 3 ), designating this measurement as r *(p.r*. t/.ZJ. D1cwen 
( llJK7) has shown that these two measures of loss \viii bracket the loss defined in equation (3 ), i.e., 
(6) 
lhus, using the initial price of y, r0 , as a fixed price tends to overstate the Allais-Diewcrt measure of 
production sector waste, \Vh i le using the unobscrvab le internal equ i I ibri um price r * tends to understate 
It 
!nterprelalion ond Con/nisi with Other /vfeosure.1· 
This measure of loss examines how much more efficiently resources vvithin the producing ~ector 
could be allocated. while protecting consumers from ::my welfare effect. We would like to C<>ntrast thi~ 
measure \Vith other measures: and to do so it is useful to note that the Hicks-Boiteux general equilibrium 
compensating or equivalent variations. and the general equilibrium Allais-Debreu measures, can all be 
expressed as the sum of the change in an appropriately-defined aggregate expenditure function and the 
change in an appropriately-defined aggregate profit function. 8 It is clear that at the very least, our 
measure differs from those measures in that it consists only of a change in aggregate profits. l3eyond 
that. the change in profit \Ve examine is for a more restricted version of the aggregate profit function than 
the others: and it is evaluated at a different set of reference prices (thus a diflerent resource allocation as 
well). so <lur measure is not simply the "producer component" of any one of these other measures. 
l urthcrmnre. it is important to recall that our measure is an aggregate dollar measure of firm profits, 
\\ hcreas the Hicks-Boiteux measure (as well as Marshall ian consumer surplus), though expressed in 
terms of dollars. are indexes of consumer utility in which all consumers are weighted equally-" 
7 
In further contrast to the more general equ i 1 i bri um measures of A lla is and Dehreu, 11 ' our measure 
Cc!nstrains the bundle of flex-price goods available to consumers to the originrtl qurtntities. with onlv the 
quantities of(ixed-rrice goods rtllowed to v<~ry. The Allais-Debreu models consider any reallocaticn1 or 
a/1 goods that keeps consumers on their original indifference surfaces. This permits our measure tc' he 
more explicitly partial equilibrium in nature than tho~:.: of Allais and Debrcu. 
An examination oftwo special cases of this loss measure permits further interpretation and 
cnmpansons with other measures of dertdweight loss. For concreteness, we describe these special cases 
111 terms of quotas in the cigarette-tobacco producing sector (Figure 1.) We assume here that quotas arc 
freely transferable among firms. The quota good, tobacco, is demanded by cigarette manufacturing firms 
'' 1tl11n the sector according to derived demand curveD,, while extra-sectoral demand is D,, yielding total 
demand D,. At the initial distorted equilibrium, quotas to producing firms permit total production ofc( 
pounds. \vhile quantity demanded by manufacturing firms (in the absence of user quotas) equals 1/ 
pounds. the tobacco price is w 11, and net exports from the sector arc Q 1 "" c/- c/. Tobacco rents. area 
H 1'hdll' 1• arc captured by tobacco producing tirms. 
Hypothetical reallocations from the initial distorted equilibrium arc constrained by net C:\porb ~11 
(}'.giving rise to the hypothetical total demand curve 1\'. Reallocations are also constrained by hold in~ 
net e.:\ ports of other flex-price goods constant at Y', which may increase the marginal cost of additional 
tobacco production yielding the hypothetical supply curveS. The hypothetical reference rcall,Kat!Oil 
results in an equilibrium with sectoral quota-commodity price >r*, production q~, sectoralmanufactur111!,! 
demand at q:, and with net sectoral exports continuing at the initial level. The measure of waste consists 
of the extra profits equal to the shaded triangle bde. This contrasts with the Marshallian surplus tnangle 
hdf ''hich is bounded by the unconstrained market demand and supply curves. At the hypothetical 
reference equilibrium. net exports from the sector remain at Q'. and the external price remains at \V 1 : 
thus. any rents earned by the sector from restricting outside sales remain at abdc. \Vithout loss or 
generality. the hypothetical reference allocation could include transfers so that each firm is restored to its 
miginalle\el ofprotits plus rents. 
Consider now a second special case of the loss measure, a two-output production sector with 
quotas <tpplied to a third intermediate good, produced and utilized entirely within the sector. A tobacco-
related e:\ample would be a sector that exported only cigarettes (x_,) and corn (x 1), with quotas applied to 
r·a\\ tobacco as an intermediate good (Figure 2.) With freely tradable quotas, the initial distorted 
8 
3 4 q q 
Figure 1. A welfare triangk representing producer sector waste 
X 2 -cigarettes 
I 
xl 
I 
h::.urc 2. Producer sector vvaste in production possibilities space 
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equilibrium might be at point a. with tobacco production quotas effectively limiting cigarette production 
to x.'/ Ifthe prices of both cigarettes and corn are fixed to the sector at the ratio indicated b) the dashed 
lines. then the optimal reallocation is at point b. \\ith the loss measured by the distance x/- x.'' when 
expressed in units of corn lftobacco quotas are not freely tradeable. and therefore not optimally 
allocated among firms. then the sector may be unable to produce the maximum amount of corn given 
ci!--'at-cttc production fixed at xi'- The initial distorted equilibrium vvould then occur at some point interior 
to the pn1duction possibilities curve such as c: in this case. there would be an additional deadweight loss 
due to the nontransferability of quotas. equal to the distance x/ x. '. 11 
Secund-< 1nler /1pproximations to the Loss Afeasure 
The expressions for the Allais production Joss in (3) and (4) do not provide much insight on how 
the magnitude of the loss depends on the size ofthe quota. In addition. the allocation X* is 
unobservable. requiring an approximation of the aggregate technology to determine its value A second-
order Taylor series approximation of equation (4) shows the dependence of the measure on the size pf the 
distortion. and. it also permits calculation of the producer sector ioss fi·om market-observable data 
t\ppmximations of Land [.1', at the initial quota allocations l/'. arc;: 
(7) 
and 
(8) 
The first two terms in (7) represent the welfare gain in terms of increased producer profit in the markets 
f(•r fixed-price commodities (holding prices constant), while the last term represents adjustment to this 
10 
profit due to induced changes in prices of flex-price commodities. This last term illustrates the 
additional information about firms' flex-price commodity behavior needed in order to evaluate (7) as 
com pC~red to (.'\ L 
lo further illustrate the nature of L", con~ider the situation in which the production sector 
consists t1ftwo distinct sets of firms. In set F, all firms arc suppliers of tradable-quota commodities with 
Q' ~~ L, q'. aggregate restricted profits Tl'(p,r;Q',z;') = L:1 , rr. 1(p,r;ql,z1; and margiml cost for ljllclUI 
commodities at an initial equilibrium level w'. In set Fd all firms arc demanders of the quota 
comm(1ditics with ft = I,1d r/, aggregate re:o:.tricted prot-its rr'(p,r;Q'1,Zd) =I.~,, r-'(p,r;r/,z!J and willingcss 
t.l pa\ for the quota commodities at the initial equilibrium of »i. Using((!''- ~11) = -rQ''- Q' 11). equation 
( S) heCC1\lleS 
(9) 
lh1s is a specific welfare triangle generated by firm behavior when LKing e\:ogenous pricesp and r. 
holding aggregate Q constant. Q'* is unobservable. but we may approximate the expression by a tlrst-
order Taylor expansion of equation (9) at the distorted equilibrium. yielding an appruximation of the 
triangle as 1 ' 
(1 0) 
In the case of a single quota commodity. this quantity is the triangle that is shaded in Figure I. \\hc:-c the 
seconcl derivatives associated with ( 1 0) are the slopes of S'and D/. 
Application to U.S. Tobacco 
\Ve illustrate the approximate loss measures with app I ication to tobacco quotas in the Ll nit eel 
States. The average annual deadweight producer sector loss due to quotas on tobacco production i~ 
estimated for the combined tobacco and cigarette producing subsectors. The measure consists of the 
maximum extra profits that could be generated within the sector- an amount over and above that 
necessary to compensate tobacco producing firms for quota rents they receive (the transfer \vhich we 
take to be the objective ofthe quota policy). This loss measure is particularly useful here because the 
\\clfarc implications oftraditional consumer surplus measures are obscured by externalities in tobaccc1 
cun~umption and by the problems of how to \Veight U.S. versus foreign consumers. 
1 1 
There are a number of types of tobacco produced in the United States, and most have been 
~ubjcct tn acreage or output quotas \vith varying degrees of market transferability. In this application we 
consider the aggregate of all tobaccos for the base period 1050-1982. Trade in tobacco prnclucts was 
extensive during this time: about 40 percent of total tobacco production and 1 ()to 15 percent or cigarette 
production \Vcre exported, while the share of imported tobacco in cigarettes rose from about 1.ew tu 
nearly 30 percent. 
Let aggregate profit functions for the tobacco processing and producing subsectors 
hL' rrtrp. (/zJ) and IT'(p:Q'.z'), where: p = (f'x· p,) is the price vector for the relevant nctputs including 
grain. livestock, foreign tobacco, and cigarettes [(X)()]; Q' and Q' an; ag!Lrcg<tte quantities ufdomcstic 
t(1hacco demanded and supplied; and z'1 and z' are vectors of fixed nctputs. There arc no flex-price 
ulmllloditics because, except for tobacco, there arc no other commodities that arc both supplied and 
demanded \Vithin this sector, and the sector can be viewed as a price taker relative to the rest of the world 
ecl>nonn. We further assume that tobacco quotas apply only to tobacco producers, and that they arc 
optimally distributed among those firms (non-transfcrabiltty losses arc separately measurable, and other 
estimates arc availablc)_~ 1 This establishes the approximation in (9) and ( 1 0) as a useful nne tc1 mcasmc 
production sector vvastc due to the tobacco quotas. 
Sumner and Alstun estimated a cost function for the U.S. cigarette manufacturing inclustr: 
defined by C(p,, H',X,.z), where X, is cigarette output with price p,, 1v is the price per pound at which U' 
billion pounds of domestic tobacco are demanded, Px is a vector of prices of imported tobacco and \lthcr 
inputs, and z is a vector of fixed inputs. It can be shO\vn that the second derivative of profits rcqtmcd t\vr 
equation ( 1 0), can be obtained from the estimated cost function Cas 1' 
( ll ) 
Lvaluating the second derivative of the Sumner-Alston cost function at the mean ( 1950-X2) levels ot' 
prices and output and converting from 1972 to 1982 dollars using the CP1 index, we evaluate the second 
derivative, ;f the processor's profit function as 
(12) -1.06 
in doliars per billion pounds oftobacco. 16 We use the average 1950-82 market price for domestic 
t(1hacco. '51.80 lb in 1982 dollars, as an estimate of11''-
12 
For the tobacco producing subsector, a profit function of the kind desired was cstimatcd by 
Fulginiti and Perrin ( 1993a) for North Carolina for 1950 to 1982. We assume the results from that study 
arc rcprcsentative ofthc entire tobacco-producing subsector of the farm economy. Because that translog 
profit function must be evaluated at average 1950-82 levels ofthe variables, vve first transf(xm the 
function to obtain parameters of the profit function, and then scale up these \alues to the liS lcvcl by 
multiplying the cstimatcd slope by the ratio of l!.S. to N.C. production 17 In 198:?. dollars, the resulting 
estimate~ are 
Il~,(p;Q',z') = 1.33, and 
(13) 
0.1035, 
\\here Q' is again in billions ofpounds. 1R These results imply a wedge of:?.6 percent between the avcrage 
market price and producer price ($1.80 vs $1.33), which is consistent with Sumner and Alston's rerort 
that quota lease rates averaged 25.6 percent of market pnces during 1977-81 l nscrting these estimates 
into ( 10) yields the estimated production loss of 
(l..t) I 0 " -0.5 ( 1.80- 1.33 )(-0.1 035- 1.06) 1( 1.80-1.33) 0.095 
or $95 million in 1982 dollars. 
To put this number in perspective, $95 million is about 3 percent of the average $3.25 billion 
market value of the tobacco crop during the 1950-82 period. This is a measure of quota-induced 
deachveight loss due to misallocation of tobacco-cigarette sector resources. This estimate of loss is 
greater than thc $32 million general equilibrium estimate by Fulginiti and Perrin ( l993b) that rclicd on 
much of the same data. That study assumes U.S. cigarette demand to be identical to U.S. tobacco 
demand (with a slope of -3.33, compared to -1.06 here), and it treats the United States as a closed 
econl)ll1Y \vith tobacco and a numeraire good as the only commodities. 
Other estimates of U.S. tobacco quota deadweight losses have been reported by Johnson, by 
.John:,on and Norton, and by Alston and Sumner. It is of interest to contrast our measure of producer 
sector waste with their measures ofMarshallian social surplus deadweight loss. The deadweight loss 
triangle of those studies is the one bounded by the worldwide derived demand for U.S. tobacco and the 
supply of L.S. tobacco. Johnson's deadv·ieight loss calculations for flue-cured tobacco in 1965 usc a 
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tnhacco supp!) elasticity of0.4, a domestic demand elasticity of-0.5, a foreign demand elasticity of 5 
;mel price wedge of $0.18. Using the methodology in this paper \Vith these parameter values yield\ a 
producer sector deadweight loss of $7.5 million in 1965 dollars, compared to Johnson's calculation of a 
worldwide Marshall ian loss of $21 million. Johnson and Norton estimate world deadweight loss due to 
this program at $45 million in !980, using a different set ofparameters 19 but we cannot calculate the 
implied producer loss because they do not rep011levels of all variables needed for the calculation 
;\]:-;t,ln and Sumner examine approximately the same period as our study, but they estimate the tobacco 
~liP]'!: elasticity at 5.0, domestic demand ela,ticity for tobacco at -!.0, foreign demand elasticity at -LO, 
;md an average price wedge of$0.30 (in 1987 dollars). Using their parameter values and the 
mctlwdology in this paper, we obtain an average producer sector dcadv,:cight loss of $25 million 
cnmparecl to their estimated worldwide Marshallian losses of$73 million in 1987. 2(' 
Thus. when \.YC use our method with the parameter values of these two other studies. estimated 
producer sector losses due to tobacco quotas (ignoring any separate losses due to non-transfcrabilitv) arc 
about one third of the dollar value of the estimated Marshallian deadweight loss. However. these dollar 
values arc not directly comparable, because the Marshallicn social surplus can be interpreted only as ;r11 
mdcx ol" consumer vvelfare in which the utility of a dollar for each consumer is equal.\\ hcrcas the 
producer sector loss can be directly interpreted as dollars of foregone profit. 
Conclusions 
We have developed an adaptation of Diewcrt's production-sector Allais loss as a measure elf 
deadweight loss due to quota restrictions. Dcadvveight loss is the excess burden suffered by using 
inccntive-distor1ing instruments rather than a lump-sum transfer to achieve the goal of the quota polic\ 
The advantage of the production sector loss measure, as compared to more general equilibrium notiuns 
of loss. is that it does not require information about tastes of individual consumers or welfare weights on 
\arious households' marginal utility of money. A disadvantage is that it is only a partial measure of the 
de:t(hveight loss to society. The Allais-Diewcrt production sector loss measure examines the additional 
profits that could be extracted from the production sector, subject to the constraint that the wclt~1rc of 
,lutsidcrs is not affected by the internal reallocations considered. 
Our particular version of this loss measure is adaptable to a variety of partial equilibrium 
applications because it permits consideration of commodities whose prices arc strictly or partially 
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determined by producer-sector behavior, in addition to quota commodities and fixed-price commodities 
Second-order approximations of this measure of waste. which make use of parameters of very 
specifically defined profit functions, make possible empirical measurements of the loss, 
Given some recent estimates of the necessary profit functions in the case of tobacco pn)duction 
and processing. we arc able to estimate that the production sector loss due to •uhacco quotas. evaluated at 
the mean of 1950-X2 data, was approximately S95 million per year. or about 3 percent of the value of the 
cn)p \Vc also applied our method using the estimated parameters of two previous studies of Marshall ian 
dcalhveight loss clue to the U,S, tobacco program, and found that the dollar value of producer sector 
\\a ste \\as about a th ire! of the estimates of the \1arshall ian deadweight loss, However. do liar values uf 
\ Ltr~ha II ian deadweight loss are best interpreted as indexes of consumers' well- being (in which the 
marginal utility of money for all consumer<; is equal)~ thus. they arc not directly comparable to the dollar 
\a lues of producer sector waste, 
The proposed Allais-Diewert production loss measure provides an estimate of a particular kind 
of deadweight loss from quotas, Our study thus offers an approach to deadweight loss measurement that. 
while free of interpersonal \Vclfare comparisons. still alkms quantification ofthe clead\\eight luss In the 
usc of quotas to transfer income among groups in society, We demonstrate its empirical viability and 
interpretation in nne case. and believe that it can be used to evaluate other changes in quota polic1c~ 
associated with international trade and environmental regulation, 
ENDNOTES 
I. Deadweight loss. also referred to as waste, excess burden. social cost and distributable SIIrplus, rc!Cr~ 
to the cost to society of using an incentive-distorting instrument to achieve a transfer. rather than a 
simple lump-sum transfer of the same amount. 
The distributional effects of quotas also require special theoretical elaboration relative to the C<hc l'f 
tax instruments. since quotas themselves imply both positive and negative transfers among quota 
market participants, whereas taxes imply transfers from all market participants to the government fur 
~ubsequent redistribution . 
. I ust. H uet h. and Schmitz (Chapter I) provide a good review of conceptua I approaches related to 
\\illingness to pay, and of the difficulties relating to compensation. 
Referring to Figure 1. the usual reference equilibrium is pointf vvhere the supply and demand curves 
arc either Marshall ian curves, or Hicksian curves that identify compensating or equivalent variation. 
or general equilibrium curves tracing out general equilibrium response to gradual relaxation of the 
quota intervention (e.g., Thurman). In each of these cases, ho\\ever. the reference equilibrium (h 
based (ll1 the di:-;tribution of incomes that result h·om these equilibrium pnce adjustments If the 
required compensation transfers are then made, every agent who provides or recei\·es a transfer ma\ 
behave differently, and an equilibrium different tlnnfmust then be the appropriate reference 
equilibrium. 
5 Allais (197J. 1977) summarizes the contribution ofthe early pioneers in this area, while summaries 
of more recent developments can he found in Auerbach. 
6. Some refer w this as an cf/icicnc_v measure of deadweight loss. since. in essence, it examines the 
minimum amount of a basket of goods required to achieve a given welf~1re objective (namely. the 
current one). 
7 In the particular example of tobacco. the production sector will be defined to include both the 
subsector of farms involved in tobacco production and the tobacco manufacturing: sector, with the 
quotas being imposed on farm-level production. 
S Sec Kay and Keen or Fulginiti and Perrin ( 1993b) for elaboration and demonstration of this point. 
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CJ The measure described in this paper also differs in t\\O ways from \vclfarc measures based on the 
Trade Expenditure Function (Anderson and \:cary, Vousden, Martin and Alston). First. measure:. 
based on the Trade Expenditure Function are general equilibrium llicks-13oitcu:-: measures of the 
money-metric equivalent of foregone consumer welfare, including but not limited tl1 misallocations 
in the producing sector. Second, since the Trade Expenditure Function equilibria do not involve 
compensation. the implicit we!f:1rG function specifies equal weights on each coJlSUiller's \\illingncss 
to pay, 'vhercas uur measure does not. 
i () A general equilibrium version of L (measuring production and consumption \vastc) would include 
npcnditure functions describing consumer behavior given the initial utilit) allocation. Sec Fulginiti 
and Perrin ( 1993b). 
) l In this particular case the measure coincides \Vith Hicks' (1940) measure ofproductiun inctTicicncy 
as Introduced in his Figure 3.2. 
12 To obtain the approximation about the initial value of q, first evaluate L at r* so 
that L(p.r· ,q 0 z) = II(p,r· ;q·,z) - II(p,r· ;q 0,z) Then. recognizing that r* is a function of tj. usc 
r q = IIq + (llr - y)'r q , where the last term is zero so that Lqq 
of the Taylor expansions of r *, L". or L. at q. 
II qq II r This permits evaluatJun qr q 
1] At Q" we knO\v from (5) that -IIQ. = -II~, First-order approximation of (I) about the distorkd 
14 Production quotas (acreage quotas in earlier years) are assigned to individual farms. and 
transferability of the quotas among farms. within and between counties. has been subject to 
limitations of varying severity over the period considered. To the extent that non-transferability 
results in differing marginal production costs across farms, production inefficiencies are induced 
beynncl those considered in this study. In terms of Figure 2, the loss due to non-transferability is x 1 '-
,,:_ \\hile the study here provides only an estimate ofthe loss from transferable quotas of x/- .\/ 
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To capture these additional costs with our methodology we would need an estimate ofii'rp.q'Jf ..• ~') 
\\ ith as many quota constraints as counties. Alston and Sumner separately esttrnated tht: non-
transferability portion of losses by noting that quota rental rates in low-rent counties averaged ah,lltt 
$.05.% less than for the average of all counties, and inferred that non-transfer:tbility increased 
average production costs by this amount (3 percent of market price. about $"75 milli\1n nationalh .) 
Their approach assumed a perfectly elastic supply curve for each count), however. Another estimate 
,1f tht: non-transferability portion of losses is provided by Rucker. Thurman and Sumner. who 
csttmated marginal cost curves for each county and calculated that non-transferability in North 
( arolina increased production costs by an average of eight-tenths of one percent of crop value over 
the period 1977-86. These studies complement the present study in that they provide measures of 
addition a I producer sector waste that is clue just to the non-transferability uf quota. 
15 !he relationship of this cost function to a profit function II", where subscnpt ,. indicates virtual prict:s. 
~~ 
IT"(p w ·z d) 
' v' 
=-C(p w ·X J z d\ + p X J 
x' v' c ' ) c c 
and so rr~,~, = -C'w,w • . Using a result obtained by Fulginiti and Perrin (1993a. equation 20) and 
assuming competition in the tobacco industry (Sumner). i.e., w, = \V, it can also be shown that 
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cl (p .v" d) 
».,w .. x'Wv~l.c 'Z · 
l h. This slope implies a domestic demand ehsticity of tobacco of -1.64. 
17 Thi-;; scaling is appropriate if the supply elasticity and price are the same for the US. and for \,l)rth 
Carolina. 
l X lim slope implies a tobacco supply elasticity of 7.14. 
! q I hey usc a tobacco supply elasticity of 1.0, a domestic demand elasticity of -0.2. a foreign demand 
cla~ticity of -2.3. and a demand price S0.20 above equilibrium. Johnson further estimates a separate 
acreage restriction loss of $25 million, while Johnson and Norton estimate a separate non-
transferability loss of $48 million. 
::o -\!stem and Sumner estimate separately an additional $75 million dead\\ eight loss due to non-
transferability or quotas. Also. Alston and Sumner examine the distribution of !vlarshallian surpluse~ 
prior to adding them together to obtain deachveight loss. They find that the quota program yield~;\ net 
t\1arshnllian gain to the U.S. producing sector of$314 million (total quota rents minus foregone 
profits) and lusses to U.S. consumers of $2 14 m i Ilion, for a net gain to the U.S. of S l 00 m i 11 ion ancl 
losses tl• foreigners of$! 73 m i 11 ion. 
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